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MINNICK V. Mississippi: ATTORNEY AND CLIENT JOINED
AT THE HIp

THE FIFTH AMENDMENT of the United States Constitution
states in part that "[n]o person shall ...

be compelled in any

criminal case to be a witness against himself."' This clause has
provided the basis for Supreme Court rulings on the courtroom
admissibility of confessions obtained in the course of custodial interrogation. 2 Specifically, the Court has ruled that prior to interrogation police officers must inform an accused that he or she has
the right to have counsel present during the interrogation.3 In addition, once the accused has asserted the right to consult with
counsel or to have counsel present during questioning, the police
are required to cease the interrogation and may not initiate subsequent interrogations without counsel being made available to the
accused.4

In Minnick v. Mississippi,5 the Supreme Court of the United
States held that once an accused person requests the assistance of
counsel, the police must cease interrogation and may not reinitiate
it without the presence of counsel, regardless of whether the accused has consulted with his or her attorney.6 In Minnick, the defendant escaped from the Clarke County, Mississippi, jail with a
fellow prisoner, Dyess, and a day later was involved in the murder
of two people. Four months later, Minnick was arrested by the
San Diego police. Minnick testified that he was mistreated by the
local police after being arrested. 7 Two FBI agents came to the jail
to question Minnick on the following day. Minnick testified that
he refused to be interviewed but was told that "he would 'have to
go down or else.' " The agents read Minnick his Miranda rights,
1. US. CONST. amend. V.
2. A custodial interrogation is a "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). Obviously, those
arrested for crimes have been deprived of their freedom of action in a significant manner.
3. Id. at 474.
4. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981).
5. 111 S. Ct. 486 (1990).
6. Id. at 491.
7. Minnick v. State, 551 So. 2d 77, 82 (Miss. 1988), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 486 (1990).
8. Minnick, 111 S. Ct. at 488.
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and he acknowledged that he understood them. He refused to sign
a rights waiver form, however, and said that he would only answer
a few questions.' After answering the questions, Minnick concluded the interview by stating, "[c]ome back Monday when I
have a lawyer," and explained "that he would make a more complete statement then with his lawyer present."' 10 After the interview with the FBI, an appointed attorney met with Minnick on
two or three occasions. The attorney told Minnick not to speak
with anyone or sign any rights waiver forms."
The following Monday, Deputy Sheriff Denham from Mississippi came to the San Diego jail to interview Minnick. Minnick
testified that he was again instructed by his jailers that he must
speak with Denham and could not refuse to do so.' 2 Denham read
Minnick his rights again, and Minnick refused to sign the waiver
form. Minnick agreed to tell Denham about the escape from
Clarke County Jail.'" Minnick discussed his escape, and then, according to Denham, Minnick described his participation in the
double murder. 4
Minnick was tried for murder in Mississippi. He moved to
suppress all the statements he had made to law enforcement officials. The trial court granted the motion to suppress the statements made to the FBI officers but denied the motion to suppress
the statements made to Denham. Minnick "was convicted on two
counts of capital murder and sentenced to death.' 1 5 On appeal,
Minnick argued that his statements to Denham were extracted in
violation of his fifth amendment right to have counsel present during the interrogation. 6 The Mississippi Supreme Court rejected
Minnick's argument and held that the confession was admissible;
Minnick then appealed to the Supreme Court of the United
States. The Supreme Court reversed the Mississippi Supreme
Court and held that Minnick's confession to Denham was inadmissible. The Court reasoned that once an accused has requested

9.

Id.

10. Id.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 493 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 488-89.
Minnick, 551 So. 2d at 82.
Minnick, 111 S. Ct. at 489.

15. Id.
16. In addition, Minnick claimed that his confession was extracted in violation of his
sixth amendment right to counsel. However, the majority ruled that it was unnecessary to
reach the sixth amendment argument since Minnick's fifth amendment rights were violated. Id.
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counsel, the police must cease the interrogation and may not reinitiate it without the presence of counsel, whether or not the accused has consulted with an attorney.
This comment examines both the majority and dissenting
opinions and concludes that the majority opinion was better reasoned than the dissent. In addition, the majority seems to be sending police the message that the fifth amendment right against selfincrimination will continue to expand. This expansion will likely
continue until better documentation of the interrogation process
permits a court to determine whether the accused's admission of
guilt or waiver of rights was in fact voluntary.

I.

HISTORY

The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution states
that no person can be compelled in any criminal case to testify
"against himself."' s The right against self-incrimination formed
the basis of the Court's ruling in Miranda v. Arizona.19 Specifically, the Court established a procedure for conducting custodial
interrogations to insure the admissibility of an accused's confession. As part of this procedure, Miranda requires police officers to
warn the accused prior to questioning that "he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an
attorney, either retained or appointed." 20 The accused may waive
these rights provided that "the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently."'" If the accused informs the police that he
or she does not wish to be interrogated, the police must end the
interrogation. If the accused indicates a desire to consult with an
attorney before answering any questions, the police may not initiate questioning. 22 Even though the accused may have answered
some questions or volunteered some information, the accused still
possesses the right to refrain from answering any subsequent
questions.2
If the accused is interrogated without the presence of an at-

17.

Id. at 491.

18. US. CoNsT. amend. V.
19. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
20. Id. at 444.
21.

Id.

22. Id. at 445. See generally J. MILES & D. RICHARDSON, THE LAW OMCER'S
POCKET MANUAL (1991) (describing the current procedures for custodial interrogations).
23. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445.
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torney, "a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate
that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege
against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed
counsel." 24 An accused's declaration of willingness to make a
statement without consulting an attorney might constitute a valid
waiver if closely followed by the statement. 25 However, a valid
waiver will not be assumed simply from the accused's silence after
the warnings have been given or from the fact that a confession
was ultimately obtained.26 In addition, a lengthy interrogation
before the accused makes a statement is strong evidence that
there was no waiver.27 Miranda's strict requirements rest on an
underlying policy of deterring police use of physical or psychological coercion to extract confessions,28 as well as protecting an accused who does not know his or her rights from unknowingly
waiving them.29
Edwards v. Arizona"0 reinforced the Miranda protections,
holding that the police may not reinterrogate an accused in custody at their own initiation once the accused has asserted the right
to counsel. 3 ' Specifically, Edwards held that an accused who requests an attorney, "having expressed his desire to deal with the
police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation
by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him,
unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police."3 2 The Edwards decision "'is designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant
into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights.' 33 Edwards
accomplishes this goal by establishing a per se rule that an accused's waiver of rights is involuntary if the accused requested
counsel and the police then initiate an interrogation before counsel
has been provided. By excluding these confessions as per se involuntary, Edwards also conserves judicial resources since the courts

24. Id. at 475.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 476.
28. Id. at 446-47, 455, 461.
29. Id. at 470-71. The strict requirements for a waiver ensure that the accused does
not act unknowingly. Id. at 475-76.
30. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
31. Id. at 485.
32. Id. at 484-85.
33. Minnick v. Mississippi, 111 S. Ct. 486, 489 (1990) (quoting Michigan v. Harvey,
110 S. Ct. 1176, 1180 (1990)).
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are not required to make the difficult determination of whether
the accused's confession was voluntary.34 Finally, Edwards estab35
lishes clear guidelines for the law enforcement profession.
While Edwards reinforces Miranda'sprotections when an accused requests the assistance of counsel, Edwards does not apply
when the accused asserts only the right to remain silent. When
only this right is asserted, the police are free to reinitiate the interrogation of the accused until the accused indicates the desire to
consult with an attorney. 6
Miranda and Edwards combine to protect the accused from
waiving rights before counsel has been made available. However,
neither addresses the question of whether these protections should
be extended to an accused after counsel has been made available.
When Minnick was arrested, and requested and was supplied with
counsel, the issue became whether the protections for waiver in
Miranda and Edwards continued to apply. The Supreme Court
answered this question in the affirmative.
II.

MINNICK V MISSISSIPPI

A. The Majority Opinion
The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether the
protections of Miranda and Edwards continued once the accused
had consulted with counsel. The six member majority held that
once an accused has requested counsel, the police must cease interrogation and may not reinitiate interrogation without the presence of counsel, "whether or not the accused has consulted with
his attorney. ' 37 The majority emphasized that the purpose of both
Miranda and Edwards was to prevent the accused from being coerced into making a statement.38 The "presence [of counsel]
would insure that statements made in the government-established
atmosphere are not the product of compulsion.""
Having asserted that the presence of counsel is the key to
preventing a forced or coerced statement by the accused, the majority offered four supporting arguments. First, the majority reasoned that a single consultation with counsel is not sufficient to
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 489-90.
Id. at 490 (citing Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 682 (1988)).
Id. at 497 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Minnick v. Mississippi, 11 S. Ct. 486, 491 (1990).
Id. at 490.
Id. (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 466 (1966)).
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counteract persistent attempts by officials to coerce a waiver. 40
The majority quoted Miranda to support this view:
Even preliminary advice given to the accused by his own attorney can be swiftly overcome by the secret interrogation process.
Thus, the need for counsel to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege comprehends not merely a right to consult with counsel
prior to questioning, but also to have counsel
present during any
41
questioning if the defendant so desires.
In addition, the majority argued that "consultation is not always
effective in instructing the suspect of his rights. ' 42 That Minnick
did not understand his rights was evident in that he thought he
could keep his admissions out of evidence by simply refusing to
sign a rights waiver form.
Second, the majority stressed that the advantages of the
"clear and unequivocal" 43 Edwards rule would be undermined if
the rule urged by Mississippi were adopted. Mississippi argued
that the Edwards protection terminates after the accused consults
with counsel, although it can be reinstated at a subsequent police
initiated interrogation if the accused requests the assistance of
counsel once again. The majority maintained that if Mississippi's
proposal were to be adopted, the Edwards protection would "pass
in and out of existence multiple times . . . .spread[ing] confusion
through the justice system and lead[ing] to a consequent loss of
respect for the underlying constittitional principle. ' 44
Third, the majority reasoned that if Mississippi's proposal
were adopted, courts would be faced with the difficult determination of what constitutes a sufficient consultation with the attorney
for the Edwards protection to be terminated.4 5 To decide this
question, courts would be required to determine the quality of the
consultation. The majority argued that these "necessary inquiries"
could interfere with the attorney-client privilege.4
Finally, the majority expressed its concern that an accused
whose counsel is prompt would lose the protection of Edwards,
while the accused whose counsel is tardy would not.47 The Missis-

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 491.
Id. (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470) (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 492.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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sippi rule might "distort the proper conception of the attorney's
duty" by sending the message that an attorney should delay consultation with the accused in order to prolong the applicability of
the Edwards rule. 8
Based on the above arguments, the majority held that once
counsel is requested, interrogation must cease, and the police may
not reinitiate interrogation without the presence of counsel, even if
the accused has conferred with counsel. 49 Therefore, since Minnick requested counsel during his first interrogation, his subsequent interrogation and confession to Denham without the presence of counsel violated his fifth amendment rights and was not
admissible.
B.

The Dissenting Opinion

The dissent argued that the Edwards protection should termi50
nate permanently once the accused consults with an attorney.
The dissent explained that "when a suspect in police custody is
first questioned he is likely to be ignorant of his rights and to feel
isolated in a hostile environment. This likelihood is thought to justify special protection against unknowing or coerced waiver of
rights." 51 This is the policy underlying Miranda and Edwards, but
once the accused has consulted with an attorney, this policy has
been fulfilled and further protection is not required.
The dissent then criticized the majority's holding, arguing
first that many persons in police custody will invoke their Miranda rights immediately so that a permanent prohibition on police initiated interrogation will attach.52 The dissent argued, therefore, that the extension of Edwards could prevent police from
initiating an interrogation for "three months, or three years, or
even three decades."53
The dissent then attempted to refute the majority's arguments. First, the dissent argued that the policy of creating a
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 496 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 495 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 496 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
53. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Other arguments made by the dissent were that the
majority was not specific as to how far to extend the Edwards rule, that this extension of
Edwards would appear to apply in the sixth amendment context, and that the extension of
Edwards would appear to apply to interrogations involving subjects other than the original
crime. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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bright-line rule did not justify the expanse of the majority's rule.54
Nor do the policies advanced in Miranda and Edwards justify the
majority's exclusion of all confessions obtained during a police initiated interrogation. After consultation, counsel may have advised
the accused of his or her rights, and the accused may no longer
feel isolated. In addition, the dissent maintained that its rule,
which would terminate Edwards protection once the accused had
consulted with counsel, was just as "clear and rational" as the
majority's rule.
Second, the dissent maintained that the precise content of the
consultation is irrelevant under its interpretation of the underlying
policies of Miranda and Edwards. All that is necessary to eliminate the feeling of isolation is that the accused be advised of his or
her rights. 55 Thus, the dissent argued that the majority's concern
with the practical difficulty or ethical impropriety of determining
the quality of a consultation was "alarmist." 56
Third, the dissent maintained that there would be no irony if
an accused with prompt counsel lost the Edwards protection immediately while an accused with dilatory counsel does not lose the
Edwards protection immediately. The dissent insisted that there is
"no irony in applying a special protection only when it is
'57
needed."
Finally, the dissent added that the majority's concern that the
Edwards rule could pass in and out of existence several times did
not apply to the dissent's proposed rule. Under its rule, Edwards
would cease to apply once the accused had consulted with counsel. 58 Finally, the dissent reasoned that since Minnick consulted
with his attorney prior to his discussion with Denham, his confession was admissible at trial.
III. ANALYSIS
The novel issue that confronted the Supreme Court was to
determine whether an accused may waive the right to have counsel present during a custodial interrogation that occurs after requesting to and actually consulting with counsel. Both the major-

54.

Minnick, 111 S. Ct. at 496-97 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

55. Id. at 497 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
56.
57.
58.

Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ity5" and dissent6" emphasized that the underlying policy of
Miranda and Edwards was to prevent an accused from making a
compelled statement at an interrogation in violation of the fifth
amendment. However, the majority and dissent disagreed on what
statements should be considered compelled. The majority held
that the threat of coercion could never be removed, and thus the
attorney's presence at a subsequent interrogation is necessary to
prevent police officers from persistently attempting to coerce the
accused into making a statement."1 Accordingly, the majority held
that any statement made by an accused without his or her attorney present was not admissible. The dissent, however, viewed the
protection more narrowly and only required that the accused consult with an attorney to eliminate the accused's "feeling of isolation and to assure him the presence of legal assistance."62 According to the dissent, once the accused has consulted with counsel,
the accused is no longer ignorant of his or her rights and does not
feel isolated; thus, the Edwards protection is no longer necessary
and should be terminated."
The opinions of the majority and dissent may be criticized on
several grounds. First, both based their holdings directly on the
text of Miranda, which does not completely support either opinion. In particular, the dissent's narrow protection draws on Miranda's concern that "[a]n individual swept from familiar surroundings into police custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces,
and subjected to the techniques of persuasion

. . .

cannot be oth-

erwise than under compulsion to speak."6 4 In addition, Miranda
stated that "[t]he accused who does not know his rights and therefore does not make a request may be the person who most needs
counsel." 65 The dissent's reading of Miranda is that the role of the
lawyer is only to remove the accused's feeling of seclusion and to
guarantee the presence of legal assistance. 66 The dissent's reading
of Miranda is incomplete. The Miranda Court also stressed the
need for counsel to be present at the interrogation, stating that
"[t]he right to have counsel present at the interrogation is indis-

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Minnick v. Mississippi, 111 S. Ct. 486, 491 (1990).
Id. at 495 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 491.
Id. at 497 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 496 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461 (1966).
Id. at 470-71.
Minnick, 111 S. Ct. at 497 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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pensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege
... . With a lawyer present the likelihood that the police will
practice coercion is reduced ... .,.""The

dissent's incomplete un-

derstanding of Miranda's conception of the attorney's role during
interrogation weakens the support that case gives its argument.
The Minnick majority's reading of Miranda is also flawed. In
support of its holding, the majority quoted the Miranda language
that the accused has the right "to have counsel present during any
questioning if the defendant so desires."' 68 While this language
does emphasize the need for counsel to be present during the interrogation, it also suggests that the defendant may choose not to
have counsel present. In addition, this passage does not indicate
whether interrogation initiated by the police and interrogation initiated by the accused are both within the rule. Further, it does not
state whether counsel must be requested at the first interrogation
or at a subsequent interrogation. Thus, this language does not support the unconditional right to have counsel present at the interrogation. Therefore, the majority's claim that Miranda requires that
counsel be present during a police-initiated interrogation after the
accused has consulted with counsel is unfounded.
A close reading of the entire Miranda opinion supports this
criticism of the Minnick holding. Miranda suggests that the accused may consult with an attorney and waive his rights in a subsequent police initiated interrogation. The Miranda Court held
that "[t]he mere fact that [the accused] may have answered some
questions . . . does not deprive him of the right to refrain from

answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned." 6 Thus, Miranda
implies that the accused may consent to interrogation after consulting with counsel. Since it is implied that the accused may
waive this aspect of the right to counsel, the subsequent interrogation may be police initiated. Therefore, this passage of Miranda
67.

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469-70 (emphasis added); see also id. at 466 (presence of

counsel "would insure that statements made in the government-established atmosphere are
not the product of compulsion"). The Court continued that "if coercion is nevertheless
exercised the lawyer can testify to it in court." Id. at 470. In general, however, an attorney

is not allowed to represent a client in a matter in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNInucT Rule 3.7(a) (1983). By failing to
comment on this implication of the attorney's presence during interrogation, the Court
appears to endorse this principle. Of course, the attorney need not testify if the same information can be secured from the interrogator or a third party observer.
68.
69.

Minnick, 111 S. Ct. at 491 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470).
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445.
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actually runs counter to Minnick.
A second criticism applicable to both the majority and dissenting opinions is that neither was required to reach the issue of
whether an accused should be allowed to waive his or her rights
after consulting with counsel'during a police initiated interrogation. The facts indicate that Minnick never waived his fifth
amendment rights prior to making statements to Denham. Nevertheless, both the majority and dissent assumed that Minnick's
waiver of his fifth amendment rights was effective.70 The relevant
facts are as follows. On Monday, August 25, Minnick was instructed that he was required to speak with Denham, a police officer. Minnick refused, but he was told that he could not refuse to
do So.71 He then met with Denham. Denham read Minnick his
rights, and Minnick refused to sign a rights waiver form. Minnick
agreed to tell Denham about the escape from Clarke County Jail,
but that was all he agreed to talk about.72 Minnick discussed his
escape, and then, according to Denham, his participation in the
double murder.73
For two reasons these facts indicate that Minnick did not
waive his rights. First, when Minnick was told that he was required to speak with Denham, he refused but was instructed that
he could not. Minnick's refusal to speak serves as an assertion of
his right to remain silent. Under Miranda, "if the [accused] is
alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be
interrogated, the police may not question him.'
However, the
police did exactly that by instructing Minnick that he could not
refuse to speak with Denham.7 5 Thus, any statement made by
Minnick subsequent to his assertion of his right to remain silent
should have been considered inadmissible. There was no need for
the majority to reach the question in this case.
The second indication that Minnick did not waive his fifth
amendment rights lies in the statements Minnick made to
70. That the majority assumed Minnick's waiver was effective is evident in that it
extended the Edwards rule to Minnick to prevent his confession from being admissible at
trial. The dissent also found that the waiver was effective, it argued that Minnick's statements were admissible.
71. Minnick, 111 S. Ct. at 488-89.
72. Minnick v. State, 551 So. 2d 77, 82 (Miss. 1988), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 486 (1990).
73. Minnick, 111 S. Ct. at 489.
74. Miranda,384 U.S. at 445.
75. The majority acknowledged that the police ignored Minnick's right to remain
silent. See Minnick, 111 S.Ct. at 491.
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Denham at the interrogation. After reading Minnick his rights,
"Denham asked Minnick to tell about his escape from Clarke
County Jail. Minnick agreed to do that much, and then, according to Denham, just proceeded to confess to the murders."1 6 Minnick therefore waived his fifth amendment rights with respect to
the escape from Clarke County jail. However, Minnick did not
specifically waive his rights with respect to the murders. Since
Minnick was interrogated without the presence of an attorney, "a
heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against
self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel. 17 A valid waiver will not be assumed simply from the accused's silence after the warnings have been given or from the fact
that a confession was ultimately obtained.78 As the Supreme
Court has stated, "we should 'indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights.' . . .
Doubts must be resolved in favor of protecting the constitutional
claim."7 9 Therefore, since Minnick never affirmatively waived his
fifth amendment rights with respect to the murders, his subsequent confession to Denham should have been considered
inadmissible.
Since Minnick's confession was inadmissible under Miranda,
why did the majority and dissent construct new rules to support
their holdings? The dissent likely constructed a new rule since, in
its view, the Edwards rule was a mistake. Indeed, the dissent referred to Edwards as "a past mistake." 80 The majority's rule was,
in the dissent's view, a present mistake since the accused's right to
counsel was based only on the need to inform the accused of his or
her rights and insure against isolation. While Miranda advanced
these interests, it also emphasized the need for counsel to be present at the interrogation in order to prevent abuses. Thus, the dissent sought to develop a new rule to curtail the Miranda and Edwards protections.
The majority sought to expand the Edwards protection. The

76.
77.
78.
79.
U.S. 458,
80.

Minnick, 551 So. 2d at 82 (emphasis added).
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475.
Id.
Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 633 (1986) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
464 (1938)),
Minnick, 111 S. Ct. at 497 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent obviously had an

additional motive for constructing the new rule-no legal precedent would permit Minnick's confession to be admitted in court.
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majority opinion emphasized that the presence of counsel at interrogation was crucial to preventing abuse.81 While neither Miranda
nor Edwards directly supports the majority's expansion of the Edwards rule, 2 the policy behind these decisions does. Both Miranda and Edwards emphasized the role of the attorney in
counteracting police brutality and coercion to extract confessions.8s Seeking to advance this interest, the Minnick majority required the presence of counsel even after there had been a consultation. The majority was concerned with the realities of the
interrogation process; this case "well illustrates the pressures, and
abuses, that may be concomitants of custody. 8' 4 Specifically, the
majority was troubled by the fact that Minnick requested not to
be interrogated but was told that he could not refuse.8 5 The majority emphasized that, if present, Minnick's counsel could have
advised him that he did not have to make a statement.8 6
On balance, the majority's holding was more persuasive than
the dissent's. The dissent did not consider the presence of counsel
necessary to prevent the police from coercing the accused into
making statements. Rather, the dissent viewed the attorney's role
as helping the accused adjust to the harsh surroundings of detention. Once this acclimation had taken place, the dissent argued,
the accused would be able to deal with the environment without
an attorney.
The dissent's simplification of the attorney's role may be criticized for several reasons. First, under Miranda, the presence of
counsel is a key factor in preventing abuse, and the dissent improperly ignored this important point. Second, the requirement of
having an attorney present prevents the police from constantly
reinterrogating the accused every time the accused has consulted
with counsel. The purpose of this reinterrogation could only be to
coerce or badger the accused into making statements that would
not ordinarily he made with an attorney present at the interrogation. Third, the attorney may detect and be available to testify to
coercive conduct observed during the interrogation. Finally, since
the majority rule does not prohibit accused initiated discussions
81. Id. at 490 ("Our emphasis on counsel's presence at interrogation is not unique to
Edwards." (emphasis in original)).
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 446-47, 455, 461.
Minnick, 111 S. Ct. at 491.
Id.
Id.
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with the police 87 and the dissent's rule does nothing to prevent
interrogation abuses, the majority's rule is preferable.
However, the question of how the majority's rule compares
with the rule proposed by Mississippi remains. Mississippi proposed that the accused be entitled to waive his or her rights after
consulting with counsel. Under this proposal, the Edwards rule,
which excludes any statements made by an accused after requesting but before consulting with counsel, would terminate once the
accused consults with counsel. Mississippi would permit the accused to reinstate this protection simply by requesting the presence of counsel again at a subsequent police initiated interrogation. The majority rejected this proposed rule, since it would
permit multiple sequences of activation and termination of the
Edwards rule prior to arraignment. Furthermore, at arraignment
the Edwards protection might reattach by virtue of the sixth
amendment. 8 Thus, the majority concluded that the rule proposed
by Mississippi would "spread confusion through the justice system
and lead to a consequent loss of respect for the underlying constitutional principle."8 9
The majority's concern regarding confusion is unpersuasive.
Mississippi's proposed rule is clear. Once the accused has consulted with counsel, the Edwards rule terminates and the police
may reinitiate an interrogation.9" However, the accused may reactivate the Edwards protection simply by requesting the presence
of counsel at this subsequent interrogation. Under Mississippi's
proposed rule, the accused has two options. First, the accused may
request the presence of counsel at the interrogation. Having done
so, the police must cease the interrogation, under Miranda, and
may not reinterrogate the accused, under Edwards, until the accused has consulted with counsel. However, the accused has the
option of waiving his or her fifth amendment rights and making
statements to the police at this second interrogation. These are the
87. Id. at 492.
88. Id. "The arraignment signals 'the introduction of adversary judicial proceedings'
and thus the attachment of the Sixth Amendment." Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625,

629 (1986) (quoting United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187 (1984)). The sixth
amendment guarantees the assistance of counsel at postarraignment interrogations once the
request has been made by the accused. Id. at 636. When Edwards expanded the fifth
amendment protections of Miranda, the sixth amendment protection was expanded to pro-

hibit the police from reinitiating an interrogation after the accused has requested the assistance of counsel. Id.
89. Minnick, I11 S.Ct. at 492.
90. Id. at 491-92.
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identical options the accused had when first taken into custody
and interrogated. Thus, the proposed rule is actually consistent
from interrogation to interrogation; therefore, the risk of confusion is minimal.
A further criticism of the majority's reversal is that Mississippi's rule does not require the accused to learn any new procedures in order to exercise fifth amendment rights; all the accused
needs to know is that in order to activate and reactivate the Miranda and Edwards protections a request for counsel must be
made. Therefore, even though the Edwards protection may be activated and terminated several times, the procedure by which the
protections are called forth is simple and unchanging. Finally,
under Mississippi's rule, the police only are required to know the
same procedures that must be used at the initial interrogation.
Thus, Mississippi's rule will have little impact on police training.
The majority's final argument was that Mississippi's rule
would send the wrong signals to an accused's attorney. The majority maintained that the attorney might delay meeting with an accused to preserve the Edwards protection. However, there is no
tactical advantage in having an accused sit in police custody while
the police are unable to begin an interrogation rather than having
the accused speak with the police in the presence of counsel.9 1 In
fact, an attorney has the obligation to "act with . . . promptness
in representing a client." 92 Thus, purposeful delay by an attorney
likely will be an ethical violation. Therefore, the majority's concern that attorneys will delay meeting with their clients is not
compelling.
The majority's arguments rejecting Mississippi's rule are not
persuasive, since the Majority's rule has no obvious legal or practical advantage over Mississippi's proposed rule. Given that the
majority's rule has no obvious advantages, it remains unclear why
the majority was opposed to Mississippi's rule. The only difference
between Mississippi's rule and the majority's rule is that Mississippi's rule allows an accused to waive his or her rights in a subsequent police initiated interrogation after the accused had consulted with counsel. Therefore, Mississippi's proposed rule
contains all the features of the majority's rule and has the added
quality of permitting police initiated interrogations. The majority

91.

This assumes that the Mississippi rule requires not only consultation with counsel

but also that counsel be present at the interrogation.
92. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.3 (1983).
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should have adopted this rule.
Why did the majority fail to do so? Perhaps the majority
wanted to send the police a message that until the integrity of the
interrogation process is insured, the Supreme Court will continue
to expand the protections of Miranda and Edwards.93 Therefore,
the majority preferred the rule that would eliminate entirely the
threat of the police coercing an accused into making a statement.
In fact, the majority emphasized this concern several times
throughout its opinion. In addition, the majority stressed that
waiver of rights and admissions of guilt will not be effective "unless there are both particular and systematic assurances that the
9' 4
coercive pressures of custody were not the inducing cause.
Therefore, "[s]ince the State is responsible for establishing the
isolated circumstances under which the interrogation takes place
and has the only means of making available corroborated evidence
of warnings," 95 the majority decided to eliminate the threat of coercion and abuse by prohibiting all police initiated interrogations,
even though the accused has consulted with counsel. 96
CONCLUSION

Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Minnick were
flawed in their use of Miranda and Edwards for support. However, under the policies of Miranda and Edwards, the majority
opinion is more persuasive. Nevertheless, the majority's expansive
rule presents two interesting ironies. First, even though an accused
requests and consults with counsel and is informed of his or her
rights, the accused may not waive these fifth amendment rights.
However, an accused who has not requested or consulted with
counsel and who may be ignorant of these fifth amendment rights
may waive them. Thus, the ignorant accused may waive rights

93.

See, e.g., Y. KAMISAR,

W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:

(7th ed. 1990) (presenting different views on the
requirement that police officers make sound recordings of interrogations).
CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 505

94.
95.

Minnick, 111 S. Ct. at 492.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475.

96. This burden is especially appropriate given the frequency with which an accused
is abused during an interrogation, see Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U.

CHI.

L.

REv. 435, 448 n.26 (1987), and the reluctance of courts to exclude an accused's confession.
See, e.g., Illinois v. House, 141 Ill. 2d 323, 566 N.E.2d 259, 280-85 (1990) (statements by

accused held admissible where police held the accused in an interview room for two days
and one night, required him to sleep on the interrogation room table, questioned him repeatedly, and only allowed him one brief telephone call).
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that the well-informed accused may not.9 7 The only cure for this
irony is to require the presence of an attorney at all police initiated interrogations. Only time will tell whether the Court is willing to go that far.
The second irony is that in order to raise the majority's rule,
the accused must request the presence or assistance of counsel. If
the accused asserts only the right to remain silent, neither the Edwards nor the Minnick rule will be triggered. The requirement
that the accused recite the "appropriate words" to trigger these
protections also disadvantages the ignorant accused. A possible
cure for this irony is to require the police to inform the accused of
the consequences of the wording chosen to exercise one's fifth
amendment rights. 8
These ironies are indicative of the need to consider additional
protections in order to provide meaningful fifth amendment protection for all persons. Minnick carries forward but does not complete this task. Let us hope that Minnick is not the end of progress
toward that goal.
IRAH DONNER*

97. See Minnick v. Mississippi, I11 S. Ct. 486, 497 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
98. See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL supra note 93, at 478 (discussing how
much information the police should supply to the accused).
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